Trial Procedure--The Special Verdict in Civil Cases by Bondurant, John T.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 48 | Issue 3 Article 6
1960
Trial Procedure--The Special Verdict in Civil Cases
John T. Bondurant
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bondurant, John T. (1960) "Trial Procedure--The Special Verdict in Civil Cases," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 48 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol48/iss3/6
KENTUcKy LAW JoRNAL
TRIAL PROCEDURE-THE SPECIAL VERDICT
IN CIVIL CASES
The purposes of this article are: (1) to trace the origin of the
special verdict and its development into the procedure embodied
in Kentucky Civil Rule 49.01; (2) to outline some of the more serious
defects of the general verdict and to show how they are corrected
by the special verdict; (3) to consider some of the problems, both
theoretical and practical, connected with the use of the special ver-
dict; and (4) to examine the possibilities for extension of the special
verdict in Kentucky practice.
Since the provisions for the special verdict in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure1 are identical with those in the Kentucky Rules,2
much of the comment about the former should be applicable to the
latter. Moreover, as there have been no Kentucky decisions inter-
preting this rule, the federal courts have been almost exclusively
relied upon in this note for case authority. Decisions on the federal
rules would no doubt be strong persuasive authority should similar
situations arise in Kentucky practice.
SPECrAL VEawicrs: Omx w Am DEvELopmN
The origin of the special verdict can be traced to the use of the
common law jury of attaint. When the jury returned a general ver-
dict which the judge considered improper, a jury of attaint, con-
sisting of twenty-four men, was summoned. If this body returned
a different verdict, the original jury was deemed guilty of perjury
and its members were punished. To avoid this result a jury could,
after the Statute of Westminster II, render a special verdict on its
own initiative to shift the burden of final determination of the cause
to the trial judge and thereby escape the danger of attaint.3
The common law special verdict which arose out of this procedure
took this form: the jury found all the facts in the case, referred the
law arising on such facts to the decision of the court, and concluded
"if upon the whole facts found the court shall be of the opinion that
the plaintiff had a cause of action, . . . [we] find for the plaintiff;
if otherwise, for the defendant. 4
However, the common law special verdict contained several sig-
nificant shortcomings which severely restricted its use. These were
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (hereinafter referred to as FR).
2 Ky. R. Civ. P. 49.01 (hereinafter referred to as CR).
8 Note, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 95, 97 (1951).
4 Staton, "The Special Verdict as an Aid to the Jury in Civil Cases," 16
A.B.A.J. 192 (1930).
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expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the fol-
lowing manner:
If a special verdict be ambiguous, or imperfect-if it find but the
evidence of facts, and not the facts themselves, or finds but part of
the facts in issue, and is silent to others, it is a mistrial, and the
court of error must order a venire de novo [new trial]. 5
In 1882 the same court imposed an even stricter limitation on
the use of the common law special verdict.6 The Court held that even
when the issues of fact omitted from the special verdict were con-
ceded or not disputed at trial, the trial court could not, consistent
with the constitutional right to trial by jury, presume that jury trial on
such omitted issues had been waived.
In light of these restrictions, it is no little wonder that, though
the statutes or rules of procedure in every state except Mississippi
at one time included a provision for a special verdict7 they were
seldom put into practice. In addition to the substantive limitations
listed above, in some jurisdictions, of which Alabama is still an ex-
ample, the special verdict could only be returned at the option of the
jury, who could not be compelled to do so by the court."
As originally adopted, the Kentucky Civil Code provided that
the jury in their discretion could render a special verdict.9 In 1876
it was amended to require the court, upon motion of either party, to
direct the jury to find a special verdict.9a This type of verdict was
subject to the defects inherent at common law in special verdicts.
Being mandatory on motion of either side, it was used most fre-
quently by the defense in actions against railroads, and this practice
no doubt contributed greatly to its repeal in 1886.10
Under the Kentucky Criminal Code sections 256, 259-61, the jury
may at its option return a special verdict. As the right to trial by
jury may never be waived by the defendant in a felony case in Ken-
tucky, 1 the verdict must contain a finding on all the facts in issue.
The court cannot make a finding on any factual issue omitted from the
verdict.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938, which was a significant date in the development of the
5 Graham v. Bayne, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 60, 63 (1855).
6Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 408 (1882).
7 Note, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 95, 98 & n. 10 (1930).
8 See Note, 9 Ala L. Rev. 42, 46 (1956).
9 Ky. Civ. Code of 1854, § 325 (Ky. Acts 1850, ch. 616, § 369).
Da Ky. Acts 1875, ch. 1020.
10 Ky. Acts 1885, ch. 1170, at 120; see also Russell, Kentucky Practice and
Service, part 1, CR 49.01 (Committee Notes) (1953).
11 Tackett v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1959); McPerkin v. Com-
monwealth, 236 Ky. 528, 33 S.W.2d 622 (1930).
1960]
KENTUcKY LAW JouNAL[
modem special verdict, the special verdict was used extensively in
only three jurisdictions-Wisconsin, Texas, and North Carolina.12
The substance and form of the special verdict used in these states
will be considered later, along with the procedure provided for in
the Federal and Kentucky Civil Rules. Through an extended process
of trial and error these jurisdictions by statute and court decisions so
modified the common law special verdict as to eliminate most of its
objectionable features.13
The best of these modifications were blended with a large measure
of judicial discretion to form Rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. This rule contains the most enlightened version of
the modified special verdict in use today. It is designed to eliminate
insofar as possible the pitfalls which made use of the common law
special verdict so hazardous and was adopted without alteration as
Rule 49.01 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
CR 49.01 provides that if the court fails to submit to the jury any
issue of fact, whether material or not, each party waives his right
to trial by jury as to any issue so omitted, unless he demands its
submission before the jury retires. Thus the burden of seeing that
all important findings of fact are placed before the jury for its deter-
mination is shifted from the trial judge to counsel. Moreover, failure
on their part to have all material fact issues submitted to the jury
cannot constitute reversible error. The rule further provides that the
court shall make a finding as to any omitted issue, or if it fails to do
so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the
judgment entered on the special verdict. Thus, the danger of in-
validating a jury trial by the inadvertent omission of some material
issue of fact from the special verdict has been virtually eliminated.
COMPARISON OF GENERAL AND SPECIAL VEDIwcrs
The development of the special verdict having been outlined from
its origins at common law to its present position in modem state
and federal practice, its current operation should now be compared
with that of the general verdict. This can best be done by examining
some of the primary faults of the general verdict, and noting how
these are corrected in theory and in practice by the modified special
verdict.
Perhaps the most objectionable feature of the general verdict, and
one which the special verdict removes completely, is the need to
12 Green, "A New Development in Jury Trial," 13 A.B.A.J. 715, 716 (1927).
Ibid.; Lipscomb, "Special Verdicts under the Federal Rules," 25 Wash.
U. L.Q. 185, 190-1 (1940).
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indoctrinate the jury through the general charge in all the legal rules
which it may be called upon to apply in a given case. The instruc-
tions on the law given by the court to the jury have been character-
ized as "an effort to give, in the space of a few minutes, a legal educa-
tion to twelve laymen upon the branch of law involved in the case."14
14 Sunderland, "Verdicts, General and Special," 29 Yale L. J. 253, 259 (1920).
Few can disagree that "[1] aw cannot be taught in any such way."15
It is generally conceded that faulty instructions are the greatest single
source of reversible error. The necessity for instructions in connec-
tion with a general verdict creates traps which may ensnare the most
conscientious trial judge and result in appeals, reversals and new
trials, with a corresponding waste of time, effort and expense.' 6
On the other hand, under the special verdict only such instruc-
tions need be given as are necessary to enable the jury to under-
stand and answer intelligently the factual issues presented.' 7 As these
consist mainly of definitions of general principles of law, there is
seldom any controversy over instructions at either the trial or ap-
pellate level.' 8
Another undesirable element of the general verdict is the manner
in which the application of the law to the facts by the jury results
in a merger of the law into the verdict in such a way as to make it
virtually impossible to tell how the jurors arrived at their decision.
They may not have accurately found the facts, they may have mis-
understood the law, they may have applied it in a wholly erroneous
fashion or they may have failed to apply it at all. Though infrequent
cases may arise, generally in regard to the determination of damages,
where the verdict shows on its face a misapprehension or misapplica-
tion of the law, in the vast majority of cases the verdict gives no in-
sight into the operations of the jury.' 9 Moreover, "no analysis of the
verdict can be made which will throw any light on the process."20
The special verdict does away with the application of the law
to the facts by the jury and leaves to the jury the single task of
finding the facts. Every advantage which the jury is popularly sup-
posed to have over the court as a trier of fact is retained. In addi-
tion, the analysis and separation of the facts in the case which the
court and the attorneys must necessarily accomplish in employing
15 Ibid.
16 See Frank, "The Case for the Special Verdict," 32 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y, 142,
146 (1949).
17 Driver "A Consideration of the More Extended Use of the Special Ver-
dic," 25 Wash. L. Rev. 43,47 (1950).
18 See Volz, "The Wisconsin Method for Submission of Fact Issues to Juries-
the Special Verdict," 23 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 206, 212 (1955).19 Sunderland, supra note 14, at 260.
20 Ibid.
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the special verdict reduces the chance that the jury will misunder-
stand the evidence.21
The form of the special verdict affords considerable guidance
to the jury by focusing its attention on each material issue and limit-
ing its consideration to them. In contrast to this, the form of the
general verdict offers little or no assistance to the jury since it simply
asks them to find for the plaintiff or the defendant. Instead, the entire
burden of guidance is placed on the judge's instructions, often with
undesirable results.22
The general verdict allows and even encourages appeal to the
biases and prejudices of the juror. Counsel, instead of pleading the
merits of the case, becomes a "pitchman" feeling out the "tip." The
spectacle which often results has been characterized as "trial by battle
of wits," little better than trial by ordeal.23
The special verdict minimizes as much as possible the undesir-
able influence that emotional sway might have on the outcome of the
litigation. In the relatively simple case, the jury will still be able to
foresee what answers to the questions will produce a judgment for
the side it favors. However, in the more complex case, where the
special verdict is particularly applicable, it will be more difficult
for the jury to appreciate the effect of its answers, and to mold them
to harmonize with its feelings. Under the necessity of answering
definite questions concerning the facts in issue, the jury will be
constrained to answer each question in accordance with the pre-
ponderance of the evidence.2 4
As a result of the secrecy which surrounds its determination, the
general verdict must stand or fall as an inseparable and indestruct-
ible unit. With a few exceptions, such as a mistake in the computa-
tion of damages, a single error completely destroys it. In contrast,
the special verdict enables errors to be localized at their source so
that the sound portions of the verdict may be saved and only the
unsound portions subjected to redetermination through a new trial.2 5
In many cases the special verdict may obviate the necessity for
reversal on appeal entirely, though the trial court may have erron-
eously construed the law of the case in some essential particular,
by providing findings of fact upon which the appellate court may
render judgment. Had a general verdict been rendered, a new trial
would have been required.2 6
21 Id. at 258-9.
22 See Volz, supra note 18, at 206-7.
23 Frank, supra note 16, at 146.
24 Lipscomb, supra note 18, at 213.
25 Sunderland, supra note 14, at 259.
26 Quoted in Staton, supra note 4, at 194.
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The special verdict may provide other procedural advantages
over the general verdict. For instance, it enables both sides of the
controversy to be more effectively and efficiently presented to the
jury through submission of independent theories of recovery or de-
fense. This is particularly helpful in auto accident litigation. The
plaintiff may attempt to show that the defendant was negligent in
several respects (such as failure to keep a proper lookout, improper
conduct, lack of management and control, etc.) any one of which
would form sufficient basis for recovery. The defendant in opposi-
tion may urge several affirmative defenses (such as unavoidable ac-
cident, contributory negligence, etc.) any one of which would absolve
him of liability. Under the general verdict, these would have to be
submitted in the alternative. If error were committed in the ad-
mission of evidence to support any separate claim or defense, re-
versal would result, even though this particular issue might not have
been considered by the jury.27
In addition, the special verdict permits findings of fact for the
guidance of the appellate court where the trial court believes that
the issues of the case can be determined as a matter of law. In the
event that the appellate court holds that the case presents con-
trolling issues of fact, it may render judgment on these findings
without remanding the case for a new trial.28
All in all, perhaps the primary advantage to be derived from
the use of the special verdict is that it enables the public, the parties
and the court to see what the jury has really done. In doing so, the
special verdict may restore the jury to the popular confidence and
respect it once enjoyed as the most reliable fact-finding device in
the history of man.
THE SPECiAL VmDuicr VEmsus SPECI.AL INTERRoGAToBmS
The special verdict should be distinguished from the general
verdict accompanied by special interrogatories, as provided for by
FR 49(b) and CR 49.02. The former is designed to facilitate the
determination of the ultimate fact issues in each case by the jury
and the application of the law thereto by the court; the latter is in-
tended only to test the jury's finding of fact on certain important
issues and its application of the law to these facts under a general
verdict.2 9
The primary advantage of the special verdict over the general
verdict accompanied by special interrogatories is the elimination of
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.29 Note, 9 Ala. L. Rev. 42, 54-5 (1956).
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the general charge. The fact that a general verdict is accompanied
by interrogatories does not do away with the difficult task of the
jury in understanding the law and applying it to the facts.30 Though
the special interrogatories expose the unreliability of the general
verdict and reveal errors otherwise concealed, they "but add ponder-
ousness, to an already over-ponderous process." 31
Moreover, the use of special interrogatories tends to retard rather
than expedite the disposition of cases. This tendency can be shown by
a consideration of the remedies open to the trial court under CR
49.02 when there is a conflict between the findings on the special
interrogatories and the general verdict. Only when the answers to
the interrogatories are in harmony with each other but so incon-
sistent with the general verdict on a material question that they
cannot be reconciled therewith is the court empowered to disregard
the general verdict and enter judgment in accordance with the
special interrogatories. Even in this instance the court cannot so act
unless the answers cover every essential element of the case and
furnish a sufficient basis for judgment. The court is not free as it
is under CR 49.01 to make its own findings of fact on an issue which
the jury has not specifically determined. If the special interrogatories
do not cover all the material issues, or if the answers are inconsistent
with each other as well as with the general verdict, the court cannot
enter judgment thereon, but it must send the jury back for further
deliberation or order a new trial.
Therefore, the better practice would be to utilize a special verdict
in lieu of a general verdict instead of special interrogatories in aid
of a general verdict, except where the special verdict may be in-
appropriate.
Tim SPECIAL VERnicr IN OPEaRAroN
The major problems which arise in connection with the special
verdict are (1) when it can be used, and (2) what form the verdict
and the instructions thereon should take.
Some of the jurisdictions which utilize the modified special verdict
provide that the court in its discretion may order the jury to return
such a verdict.3 2 Others, notably Wisconsin, go farther and require
the court to direct the jury to return a special verdict when re-
quested to do so by either party before introduction of any testi-
mony in his behalf.33 While the latter rule has the advantage of
30 Id. at 55.
31 Green, supra note 12, at 716.
3253 Am. Jur. Trial 1064 (1945). See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
33See Wis. Stat. § 270.27 (1957).
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extending the use of the special verdict by eliminating the discretion
of the court to refuse a request therefor timely made, it may produce
an undesirable or even unjust result in cases where the special
verdict is peculiarly unsuitable. The better rule, in theory at least,
and that adopted by CR 49.01, places the entire responsibility for
invoking the special verdict in the sound discretion of the court.
Following accepted judicial practice, denial of a request for a
special verdict will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellate
court feels that such a denial was a clear abuse of the discretion
of the trial court. Until federal and state appellate courts indicate
some substantial basis for approving the use of or failure to use the
special verdict, attorneys will be unable to determine when the trial
court's discretion has been abused.34 Instead, the reviewing courts
have indulged in a presumption in favor of the judgment of the trial
court which has proved almost impossible to overcome.35 As a result,
attorneys advocating the use of the special verdict have been forced
to demonstrate to the trial judge special and definite circumstances
in each case which call for its utilization.36
Rather than take the view that the special verdict is something
to be used only in unique situations the courts should approach the
exercise of discretion with the idea that the special verdict should
be used in every case unless some definite reason makes use of a
general verdict more suitable. Rather than categories the types of
cases to which the special verdict is applicable, the trial judge should
examine each case to see whether use of the special verdict would
fulfill the purposes for which it was designed.37
The Wisconsin statute prescribes in definite terms the form which
the special verdict shall take: "Such verdict shall be prepared by the
court in the form of written questions, relating only to material issues
of fact and admitting a direct answer, to which the jury shall make
answer in writing."38 CR 49.01 leaves this matter also to the discre-
tion of the court. This rule provides:
[T]he court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of
categorical or other brief answers or may submit written forms of the
several special findings which might properly be made under the
pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other methods of sub-
mitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it
deems most appropriate.
34 Note, "Judicial Discretion ni the Use of the Special Verdict," 37 Iowa L.
Rev. 95, 99 (1951).
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Id. at 104.
3sWis. Stat. § 270.27 (1957).
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Because the form of the verdict depends on the nature of each
case and the facts therein, it is proper to leave this to the discretion
of the trial judge. As a result of the wide latitude within which they
have to operate, the federal trial courts have experienced little diffi-
culty with the appellate courts in this field. From 1939 to 1949, there
was no case in which a district court was reversed because it had
submitted to the jury a special verdict inadequate in form. 39 Be that
as it may, a substantial burden still remains with the trial court to
formulate the special verdict in such a way as to maximize the dis-
cernment of truth and minimize the occurrence of error in the jury's
findings of fact.
There are five main risks inherent in the special verdict, regard-
less of the form used. They are (1) that immaterial matters may be
included therein; (2) that material matters may be excluded there-
from; (3) that conclusions of law instead of ultimate facts may be
found; (4) that evidentiary instead of primary facts may be found;
(5) that the issues may be put to the jury in such a manner as to
be uncertain, misleading, or prejudicial to either party.40 As Sunder-
land points out, these difficulties inhere in the general verdict as well
as the special, but there they are concealed from view.41
The dangers which may be anticipated from the first two risks
are negligible, in view of the provisions of CR 49.01 and the doctrines
which have been developed in putting them into practice. Under a
special verdict, the federal courts require only that the findings of the
jury necessary as a basis for judgment not be in conflict.4 Therefore,
even though the jury's finding on some immaterial issue could not
be reconciled with its finding on some or all of the material issues,
this would have no bearing on the effectiveness of the verdict.
CR 49.01 provides two methods which minimize the effect of an
omission of a material issue from the special verdict. Until the jury
retires, the prejudiced party has the right to demand submission of
the omitted issue. If he fails to do so, he thereby waives his right
to jury trial as to that issue, making it possible for the court to make
an express finding thereon. A good illustration of this principle, which
is the most important single feature of the modified special verdict,
is found in Columbia Horse & Mule Commission Co. v. American
Insurance Corp.,43 a case decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1949. Action was brought under an
39 Driver, supra note 17, at 48.
4o Sunderland, supra note 14, at 261.
41 ibid.42 See Mounger v. Wells, 30 F. 2d 521 (5th Cir. 1929).
43 173 F. 2d 773 (6th Cir. 1949).
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insurance policy to recover for the loss of forty-three mules destroyed
in a fire. The answer raised two principal defenses: (I) arson in de-
fraud of the insurer; (2) false swearing and willful misrepresentation
on the claim for injury. By agreement of counsel and after ample
notice, the case was submitted to the jury for a special verdict on
two issues: (1) Was the fire that destroyed the barns rented by the
plaintiff caused by his own act for the purpose of collecting on the
insurance policy in question? No. (2) How many mules were
destroyed when the plaintiff's barn burned on April 11, 1945? 34.
In light of the jury's second finding of fact, the court then found
that the proof of loss and affidavit claiming recovery for forty-three
mules constituted a "willful and material misrepresentation and a
false swearing in violation of the policy,"44 and dismissed the action.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that by failure of plaintiff's
counsel to submit further requests after invitation by the court, he
had waived the right to trial by jury on the issue omitted, and the
court was empowered by FR 49(a) to make a finding thereon, con-
sistent with such findings as the jury had made.45
CR 49.01 also provides that if the court fails to make an express
finding as to the omitted issue, the verdict is saved by implication that
there was a finding of fact in accord with the judgment of the court.
This provision is qualified by the requirement that in such event
the special verdict must contain sufficient findings of fact by the jury
to sustain the judgment rendered thereon.
Perhaps the greatest task which a trial court faces in utilizing
the special verdict is framing the issues so that the jury finds only the
ultimate facts in the case, not evidentiary facts and not conclusions
of law. Needless to say, this is easier in theory than in practice.
Certainly there are matters which are clearly evidentiary or legal
conclusions. Within these extremes, however, there are many in-
stances in which reasonable men might differ as to whether a given
issue calls for determination of an evidentiary fact, an ultimate fact or
a conclusion of law.
State practice on presentation of issues under the modified special
verdict varies widely. In Texas and Wisconsin, the issues are framed
so as to secure the most direct consideration of the evidence by the
jury.46 The tendency of such procedure is to burden the jury with
a multitude of questions on minute issues of fact, and the danger of
unintentional inconsistencies in the jury's findings of fact is thereby
44 Ibid.
45 Id. at 774-5.
46Note, 34 IM. L. Rev. 96, 100 .(1939). For an example of the form of the
Wisconsin special verdict, see Volz, supra note 18, at 207.
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increased. North Carolina, on the other hand, uses a different mode
of administering its special verdict. Rather than employ numerous
questions in an attempt to cover every fact problem, the trial judge
poses for the jury's consideration a few broad questions which are
accompanied by general instructions of law. For instance, the fol-
lowing issues were submitted to a North Carolina jury in an auto-
mobile negligence case:
(1) Was the plaintiff's testator injured and killed by the
carelessness and negligence of the defendant, as alleged in the
complaint?
(2) Did the plaintiff's testator, by his own carelessness and
negligence, contribute to his injury, as alleged in the answer?
(3) What damage, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover
of the defendant?48
A special verdict of this type amounts to little more than a general
verdict whose framework has been laid bare.
FR 49(a) and CR 49.01, by placing the formulation of the special
verdict entirely within the discretion of the trial judge, enable him
to shape the issues in such a manner as to produce the best possible
result in each factual situation.
Although the final form of each verdict will depend to a great
extent on the circumstances of the particular case, there are several
general principles which should be applied to prevent it from being
uncertain, misleading, or prejudicial to either party.
(1) The questions should be as few as is feasible, in simple and
clear language, with only one issue in each question.
(2) If a particular defense should have been affirmatively pleaded,
but was not, the consensus is that it should not merit affirmative
presentation as a separate issue.49
(8) The content of the questions should in no way be able to
be construed as comment on the evidence by the court. In some
state courts this is especially objectionable as an interference by the
court with the function of the jury to consider the weight of the
testimony and the credibility of the witnesses.50
(4) The questions should not assume the existence of a material
fact in controversy nor of a material fact as to which no evidence has
been entered.81 For instance, where in an automobile accident case
one of the facts in issue is whether or not there was a collision be-
tween the cars of the plaintiff and defendant, the court in framing its
questions should not include any reference to the collision as if it
47 Note, 34 I1 L. Rev. 96, 100 (1939).4s McClamroch v. Colonial Ice Co., 217 N.C. 107, 6 S.E. 2d 850 (1940).49 Lipscomb, supra note 13, at 202.
5053 Am. Jur. Trial § 591 (1945).
51 Note, 9 Ala. L. Rev. 43, 51 (1956).
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had in fact happened. However, the questions may assume a fact
when the evidence is so conclusive that reasonable men could reach
no other conclusion, or when the matter comes within the doctrine
of judicial notice. 52
(5) It is especially imperative in the submission of special issues
that each question be independent of the other; i.e., each should
be so framed as to avoid the assumption of any particular answer to
another issue. This is frequently accomplished by the use of qualify-
ing phraseology which negatives any assumption of fact as proof of
other issues. 53 Thus, instead of asking: "Was the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff a proximate cause of the action?", the court
should inquire: "If the plaintiff were guilty of contributory negligence,
was such negligence a proximate cause of the accident?"
The form of the instructions given in conjunction with any special
verdict will depend largely on the form of the verdict itself. Under
the practice in North Carolina, detailed instructions quite similar
to a general charge are necessary to enable the jury to comprehend
the significance of each inquiry.54 On the other hand, in Wisconsin
and Texas, no instruction on the law of the case is permitted. 55 How-
ever, in order to obtain an intelligent answer from the jury, the court
is allowed to assist them by defining and explaining words and phrases
-such as proximate cause, consideration, breach of warranty, etc.-
contained in the issues propounded.56
Often the necessity of giving instructions on legal standards may
be avoided by incorporating the definition into the question asked.57
For instance, in an action for trespass quare clausum fregit one of the
issues of the special verdict was: (1) "Did the defendant trespass
upon the land of the plaintiff and cut and remove therefrom cord
wood and timber trees as alleged?"58 The question as it stands re-
quires a definition of the term "trespass" in order for the jury to
answer it with reasonable certainty. This can be avoided by re-
phrasing the question: "Did the plaintiff knowingly enter upon the
land of the plaintiff without his consent and cut and remove
timber. .. ." From the evidence, the jury should be able to answer
this question without any assistance from the court.
Of course, it is apparent that not every case will be as simple
as this; invariably, there will still be inextricably mixed questions
52 Manufacturer's Casualty Ins. Co. v. Roach, 25 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md. 1939).
58 Lipscomb, supra note 13, at 200.54 Note, 34 Ill L. Rev. 96, 100-1 (1939).
55 Id. at 100.50ibid.
57 Lipscomb, supra note 13, at 205.58 Waller v. Dudley, 194 N.C. 139, 138 S.E. 595 (1927).
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of law and fact with which juries will have to deal. Instructions
on the law, therefore, cannot be wholly eliminated, but they can be
generally confined to definitions of legal terms for which no work-
able substitute can be found.
Passing from consideration of the presentation of issues under
a special verdict to the answers given in response thereto, several
additional problems are encountered:
(1) If the jury fails to make a finding on one of the special issues
submitted, the prejudiced party has not waived his right to jury trial
as to such issue. If determination of this issue can in any way affect
the outcome of the verdict and the judgment rendered thereon, the
judge must resubmit the issue to the jury before dismissal, or grant
a new trial if the jury has been dismissed. 9 This situation can be
avoided through instructions to answer all issues unless otherwise
specifically indicated and by careful examination of the verdict when
returned to see that this has been done.
(2) The general rule of the federal courts demands that the
essential findings of the jury under a special verdict must be con-
sistent with each other.60 This does not mean that every conflict in
the jury's findings will be fatal to the verdict. In order to sustain the
verdict, all the findings should be given effect if possible. If the
answers to the material issues are found to be totally irreconcilable
under any theory of the case, the trial judge should refuse to render
judgment thereon. If the jury has not been dismissed, it may be sent
back for further deliberation; otherwise, the verdict must be set aside
and a new trial granted.61
If, however, as a matter of law the findings as a whole sustain
a certain judgment and different findings on the issues in conflict
could not justify any other result, the verdict should be sustained.62
Here is an illustration of this principle. In a tort action, the jury
found: (a) that the plaintiff employee was guilty of contributory
negligence; (b) that the defendant employer was guilty of negligence
which was not the cause of the injury; and (c) that the injury was
the result of an unavoidable accident.63 Regardless of the outcome
of the apparent inconsistency between (a) and (b), the general
result must be judgment for the defendant because his negligence
was not the cause of the injury.
59 5 Moore, Federal Practice 49.01, at 2203 (2d ed. 1948).
60Mounger v. Wells, 30 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1929).61 Note, 9 Ala. L. Rev. 42, 53 (1956).
62Lipscomb, supra note 13, at 212-3.
63Herez v. Houston & T.C. R.R., 5 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
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(3) Where the provision for a majority verdict, such as provided
for by CR 48, is used in connection with a special verdict, the ques-
tion arises whether a majority of the same jurors must concur on
every essential finding of fact in order to render an effective verdict.
This problem was effectively discussed in a recent Washington case.
The judge instructed the jury that a civil action required only ten
jurors to agree on the verdict. The verdict was in the form of two
interrogatories, and favorable answers to both were essential to re-
covery by the plaintiff. One juror dissented on the first question, but
voted with the majority on question two. The final vote was eleven
to one on the first question and ten to two on the second. The trial
judge held the verdict valid since a majority of the jurors agreed on
each finding. On appeal, this holding was reversed, on the ground
that only nine jurors had agreed that the plaintiff should recover.6 4
The rule that the same ten jurors (or whatever majority is re-
quired) must agree on all of the findings essential to judgment is
well established in Wisconsin practice. There, dissenting jurors are
required to sign after each interrogatory to insure that the proper result
is reached.65 This position is based on the logic that the questions under
a special verdict represent the steps necessary to arrive at a general
verdict. Therefore disagreement on any one essential issue should
nullify the effect of that juror's consideration of the other material
issues. 66
The contrary position that the same majority need not agree on
all material issues is founded on the premise that the function of the
jury in a special verdict is to establish probabilities of fact. This, it
is argued, can be shown by an agreement of the necessary majority
of jurors on each question.6
In reality, whether the same majority should be required on each
issue depends on the nature of the verdict in the particular case.
Where the judgment is based on the cumulative effect of the jury's
findings, as in the Washington case illustrated above, the same jurors
should concur in the result. However, where there is no inter-relation-
ship between the issues submitted to the jury, as in the Mule Com-
mission case,68 such concurrence should not be required to sustain
the verdict.
64 Devoni v. Dep't of Labor & Industries, 86 Wash. 2d 218, 217 P.2d 332
(1950).
65Volz, supra note 18, at 209-11.
66 Comment, 26 Wash. L. Rev. 56, 57 (1951).
67 Ibid.
68 See page 448 supra.
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PossmLrms FOR ExTENsIoN OF THE SPECIAL VEP Dicr
Beyond the technical difficulties inherent in the special verdict,
which can be avoided to a great extent through careful draftsman-
ship on the part of the trial court, probably the greatest single factor
which has curtailed the growth of the special verdict in American
jurisdictions has been opposition on the part of the bench and bar.
Much of the hesitation on the part of lawyers and trial judges to
embrace, or at least experiment with, the special verdict can be
attributed to a lack of familiarity with the new procedure, blended
with a natural reluctance to abandon a well-known method of prac-
tice. The possible changes that the special verdict will make in trial
procedure should be examined to see if these fears are justified.
In order to achieve the best results from special verdict, it is im-
portant, if not essential, that the precise issues of fact which the
jury will be called upon to determine be formulated at an early stage
of the litigation. When the special verdict was first widely advocated,
it was thought that this could be achieved by having the pleadings
drawn in such a manner that the controverted allegations of the
complaint and the affirmative defense of the answer would form the
basis of the issues to be submitted to the jury.69 However, this be-
came impractical under the loose and general manner of pleading
which has characterized the modem rules of civil procedure.
On the other hand, these rules contain another procedural device
which is especially well-designed for formulation and restriction of
issues prior to trial-the pre-trial conference. When properly utilized
in conjunction with the special verdict, it will enable the opposing
parties and the court to arrive at and agree upon the primary facts
in issue in time to devote more consideration and preparation to
them. By following this procedure, some of the questions which
will make up the special verdict may be given to the jury before
the trial begins in order that they will be better able to follow and
understand the evidence as it is presented. At the close of the evi-
dence, if counsel and the court are of the opinion that additional
questions are necessary to cover all the material issues of fact, they
may be added to those already before the jury.7°
Lawyers who are accustomed to presenting cases to a jury for
a general verdict may find that they will have to adapt themselves
to special verdict practice. For instance, instead of submitting re-
quested instructions for a general charge, they will have to con-
69 See Sunderland, supra note 14, at 262.
70See Note, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 95, 101 (1951).
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centrate on formulation of factual issues, perhaps even at the pre-
trial conference. Presentation of evidence will be keyed to proof of
special issues, which will also be stressed in opening statements and
closing arguments. In addition, opposing counsel will have to per-
suade the trial court to adopt their view of the legal issues in the
case in rendering judgment on the jury's verdict. Thus the special
verdict will require forceful presentation of both the law and the
facts of the case by opposing counsel.
Juries may have more trouble in reaching agreement on special
verdicts. They may require longer periods of deliberation. Often they
may be unable to reach separate compromise agreements on each
of several fact findings and hung juries may result. Situations such
as these will undoubtedly arise when juries are first confronted with
special verdicts. However, it has been shown that with a little ex-
planation and assistance by the judges, they can in time be reduced
and practically eliminated.71
Where contributory negligence is a complete defense, as it is in
Kentucky, there is a strong likelihood that special verdicts will pro-
duce more decisions for the defendant in negligence actions. Though
this outcome may be attributed to some peculiarity in special verdict
practice, the same result should be reached under general verdicts,
if properly rendered. The best solution to this problem has been
achieved in Wisconsin where, under a comparative negligence
statute,72 the degree of fault of each party is determined by the jury
in the special verdict.
Judges who feel that the special verdict places on them an in-
creased burden of decision-making may on further examination find
their work-load actually lightened. They will no longer have to
struggle with interminable lists of instructions to be submitted with
the general charge. Gone will be the ever-present fear that the slight-
est prejudicial error in instruction or admission of evidence may
subject the entire controversy to redetermination. The elimination of
the need for numerous new trials may substantially reduce trial
dockets, leaving the judge more time to consider each case and the
71Driver "The Special Verdict-Theory and Practice," 26 Wash. L. Rev.
21, 24 (1951 $.
72Wis, Stat. § 331.045 (1957):
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence
resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negli-
gence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought, but any damage allowed shall be diminished in
the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering.
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law to be applied therein. Disposition of cases may be accelerated
by allowing the judge to hear arguments on the law of the case
while the jury is deliberating the factual issues.
The attitude which trial judges in Kentucky or any other juris-
diction take toward implementation of the special verdict is ex-
tremely important. First of all, in Kentucky it is the trial judge who
determines as a matter of discretion whether or not the special
verdict shall even be used in a given case. It is a well-demonstrated
fact that the special verdict has achieved more use, and increasing
popularity, in jurisdictions where either party may demand it as a
matter of right. Though there are distinct advantages in leaving the
use of the special verdict within the discretion of the trial judge,7 3
it does have the effect of reducing the initial impetus of the special
verdict in a given jurisdiction. This is especially true where the
appellate courts tend to place strong faith in the trial court's judg-
ment. Moreover, the form which the special verdict shall take is
also within the court's discretion. As previously shown, careful con-
sideration of this matter is necessary to avoid practices which, if
they do not invalidate the verdicts, at least reduce their effectiveness.
Finally, utilization of pre-trial procedure in aid of the special verdict
also rests largely with the trial court.
After thorough examination of the provisions for a special verdict
contained in the new civil rules, one reaches the inescapable con-
clusion that responsibility for the success or failure of this procedure
in Kentucky rests, more than anywhere else, in the hands of the trial
judge. By introducing the special verdict in appropriate cases, he
may educate himself, the attorneys, and even the jurors within his
jurisdiction in the use of a technique through which a gradual but
significant improvement of our judicial process may be accomplished.
John T. Bondurant
73 See page 447 supra.
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